Есть ли в Росии будущее суборбитальных полетов?

[Time_changed]

Что бы все это значило?

Что на рынке нет места сейчас для двух проектов суборбитальных полетов по 200K долларей за билет. Так как Бренсон сильно впереди в части маркетинга и проработки проекта, то у Space Adventures  и Мясищева нет шансов в результате анализа рынка.

Что-то сомнительно. Во-первых, суборбитальный туризм ещё до полёта СС1 обсуждался, и Брэнсон ещё заявлений не делал - кому надо, тот вполне успевал. Во-вторых, у Вирджин Галактик очередь довольно внушительная. В-третьих, никто не тешит себя иллюзиями, что 200 тыс долларов за билет будет вечно - рассчитывают и на 50 тыс, и ничего (http://www.novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=2533&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=45) .

В России нужен граммотный ПИАР для поднятия интереса к этой теме. Большинство вообще не знает об этом, и никогда не узнают. Заинтересовывать надо людей, и они сами решат, что им надо.

[Старый]

В России нужен граммотный ПИАР для поднятия интереса к этой теме.

Примерно как к АО МММ.
Лёня Голубков: -Куплю жене билет в космос!
Просто Мария: -Си! Си!

[Time_changed]

В России нужен граммотный ПИАР для поднятия интереса к этой теме.

Примерно как к АО МММ.
Лёня Голубков: -Куплю жене билет в космос!
Просто Мария: -Си! Си!

Если бы не скандальное завершение истории с АО МММ и не обчищение наших сограждан жуликом Мавроди, то подобного рода реклама несомненно бы сказалась на росте популярности космического туризма. В 1990-е народ был настолько оболванен, что ему хватило надолго. Сейчас таких дураков нет, хотя и остаются идиоты, несущие свои сбережения в финансовые пирамиды.

[Time_changed]

Кроме того, если российский аналог Space Adventures по своей сути будет являться финансовой пирамидой с самого начала и целью руководства будет собрать бабки и слинять из страны, то грош цена всей затее. Лучше платить иностраннной компании, и гордиться своей великой историей космонавтики, летая в космосах на СпейсШипах :evil:

[Старый]

Кроме того, если российский аналог Space Adventures по своей сути будет являться финансовой пирамидой с самого начала и целью руководства будет собрать бабки и слинять из страны...

Что значит "если"?

[Time_changed]

Что значит "если"?

А то, что есть большие сомнения насчет того, что это будет второй МММ. Просто срубить бабло на доверчивости людей.

[DAP]

Кроме того, если российский аналог Space Adventures

Что значит российский аналог Space Adventures? Space Adventures и планировало использовать российский корабль. Только затормозило сейчас на этапе ТЭО, что, наверное, говорит о том, что экономика не бьется.

[Time_changed]

Кроме того, если российский аналог Space Adventures

Что значит российский аналог Space Adventures? Space Adventures и планировало использовать российский корабль. Только затормозило сейчас на этапе ТЭО, что, наверное, говорит о том, что экономика не бьется.

Вполне может быть. А аналог - наша, российская компания. Понятно, что у нас пока рынок не развит, но у нас есть технологии и опыт -ДЕНЕГ НЕТ!!!

[avmich]

Деньги есть. Нет программы действий, бизнес-плана, который достаточно доходен и при этом достаточно малорисков... Нет управленцев, способных это сделать.

[Олигарх]

Деньги есть. Нет программы действий, бизнес-плана, который достаточно доходен и при этом достаточно малорисков... Нет управленцев, способных это сделать.

Rocket Plane Roulette
 http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Rocket_Plane_Roulette_999.html
 
      OPINION SPACE
      Rocket Plane Roulette

      by Jeffrey F. Bell
      Honolulu HI (SPX) Mar 07, 2007

      I'm a supporter of private spaceflight projects
!!! for the basic reason that
!!! Government space agencies have reached a state of total intellectual stasis with
!!! NASA's plan to redo Apollo 50 years later,
!!! China's plan to redo Soyuz/Salyut at about 1/8 the pace managed by the USSR, and
!!! Russia's plan to redo Zond with billionares in place of turtles.

      And at this very time of official stagnation, a variety of private firms
      have finally found a business model that is both within the financial
      capacity of private capital and attractive to the general public:

      Suborbital tourism.

      But there is a big problem with this nascent industry that most of its
      supporters are glossing over:
      Safety.

      The romantic half of my brain would really like to see these businesses
      succeed and prosper, but the rational half tells me that they are heading
      for a series of fatal accidents that will be financial and public
      relations disasters.
     
      To get a handle on how dangerous suborbital winged rocket flight really
      is, I have examined the safety history of research rocketplanes in the US
      and UK. That record is not very encouraging:
     
      Flight History of Experimental Rocketplanes



        Military   First    Pwrd  Date of   Cause of
Name    Serial #   Flight   Flts  Loss      Loss
------- ---------- --------   --  --------  ----------
X-1     46-062     25.01.46   62
X-1     46-063(a)  11.10.46   68    (Grounded 10.51)
X-1     46-064     20.07.51    1  09.11.51  Explosion
X-1A    48-1384    14.02.53   23  08.08.55  Explosion
X-1B    48-1385    24.09.54   24    (Grounded 01.59)
X-1D    48-1386    24.07.51    1  22.08.51  Explosion
X-1E    48-063(b)  12.12.55   22    (Grounded 12.58)
X-2     46-674     05.08.54    1  27.09.56  Inertia coupling
X-2     46-675     27.06.52   14  12.05.53  Explosion
SR.53   XD145      16.05.57   31
SR.53   XD151      08.12.57   12  15.06.58  Takeoff crash
X-15-1  56-6670    08.06.59   81    (Grounded 12.68)
X-15-2  56-6671(a) 17.09.59   31  09.11.59  Engine failure
X-15-3  56-6672(a)  (none)     0  08.06.60  Engine explosion
X-15-3  56-6672(b) 20.12.61   22  15.11.67  Pilot error
X-15A-2 56-6671(b) 25.05.64   65  03.10.67  Overheated

Sources: Jay Miller, The X-Planes
         Dennis R. Jenkins and Tony Landis, Hypersonic
         Ray Sturtivant, British R&D Aircraft

(In compiling this table, I have excluded unpowered glide flights.
      Accurate information on French and Soviet rocketplane programs could not
      be located.)
     
      Out of 16 mostly distinct airframes, 10 were totally or largely destroyed
      in accidents (along with one B-50 carrier aircraft). 5 pilots were killed
      in these accidents and 2 were severely injured.
     
      Two of these accidents would not have endangered passengers. The X-15-3
      exploded during a static engine test and the X-15A-2 meltdown occured
      during a level speed run that is quite unlike any tourist rocketplane
      profile.
     
      So for a prospective space tourist, the relevant record for suborbital
      rocketplanes is:
      8 life-threatening accidents in 458 flights, for a loss
      rate of 1-in-57 (1.75%).
     
      This is essentially the same as the Space
      Shuttle's safety record.
     
      As I pointed out in a previous SpaceDaily
      article, this is higher than the combat loss rate of any US aircraft
      operating against the Nazis in WWII!
      It's no surprise that the USAF and
      RAF cancelled their projected operational rocket fighters F-91 and SR.177.
      Four of these accidents were probably due to a single egregious technical
      blunder - the use of organic materials (leather gaskets) in contact with
      LOX. If we omit these four accidents, the crash rate is still 1-in-114.
      Even the rocketplanes that survived catastrophic accidents had
      surprisingly short lives due to the intense stresses on their components.
      46-063(a), 48-1385, and 46-063(b) all were prematurely grounded due to
      accumulated fatigue damage in propellant or pressurant tanks. The X-15
      program ended with a whimper after a month of vain attempts to get the
      sole surviving aircraft to function. The average rocketplane made only 29
      flights in its lifetime before it was wrecked or retired due to wear.
      There were also frequent aborts in which the rocketplane was not dropped
      from its carrier aircraft due to technical defects, and a lesser number
      where planned flights were cancelled on the ground. In the X-15 program
      over 350 planned takeoffs resulted in only 200 successful drops - and 11
      of these drops led to crashes or emergency landings at remote dry lakes.
      The reason for this dismal safety record is that these aircraft combine
      four incompatible technologies. During ascent, the rocketplane is a
      ballistic missile; at apogee it is a spacecraft; on descent it is a
      reentry vehicle; on approach and landing it is a glider. The result is a
      nightmare of complexity in which parts essential for one phase of flight
      are useless or even dangerous in the other phases.
     
      Are these safety statistics relevant to the 21st-century commercial
      operators? Probably not.
      !!! These Cold War X-plane projects were lavishly
      funded and enjoyed top national priority.
     
      They were designed and operated
      by some of the best technical minds in the aerospace industry and consumed
      thousands of hours of wind-tunnel time before any metal was cut.
     
      Most of today's potential rocketplane builders are tiny startup firms with
      weak technical staffs and dubious design concepts.
      One firm is planning to
      use the DC-X design which crashed, exploded, or caught fire on 25% of its
      flights; another is converting a subsonic business jet;
      !!! a third has hired
      !!! the most incompetent aircraft design team of the Cold War (Myashischev).
      ОДНАКО, как он про ЗИМ ...
     
      Burt Rutan's Scaled Composites is the only established aerospace company
      working in this field.
      But SpaceShip1 suffered serious problems on all of
      its flights above 100km and was retired after only 3 such flights.
      Clearly Rutan didn't think that it was safe enough to fly passengers instead of
      sandbags - or even safe enough to make a few more proving flights to
      explore the economics of SpaceShip2.
     
      Those firms that are planning to use hybrid engines tout them as safer
      than the old X-plane engines that used liquids for both fuel and oxydizer.
     
      But the X-plane pilot could jettison both propellants in an abort
      situation to get down to normal landing weight.
      Hybrids have a solid fuel
      neccessarily carried in the tail and a liquid oxydizer neccessarily
      carried in a pressure tank further forward. The hybrid rocketplane pilot
      faces the choice of dumping only the oxydizer and coping with a massive
      trim change or retaining it for a proper CG and landing extremely fast and
      heavy. Such a landing after a partial fuel jettison broke the X-15-2 in
      half.
     
      This is exactly the sort of problem that could be fixed by a simple FAA
      regulation. In this case they need only require that the solid part of the
      engine be ejectable in emergencies. Since the engine already needs to be
      removed and recast after every flight, this would be easy to accomplish
      without much extra hardware.
     
      But the rocketplane promoters lobbied the US Congress into passing a law
      that greatly restricts regulation of their industry until 2012. Tourist
      rocketplanes will operate in the kind of regulatory vacuum that existed in
      the barnstorming era of aviation. The promoters seem to have forgotten
      about the huge number of people killed in that era, and the numerous
      airlines that failed financially or were taken over by governments.
      Any ordinary aircraft has completed thousands of test flights before the
      FAA certifies it to carry passengers. But airliners are much cheaper to
      operate than rocketplanes and developed by huge corporate consortia with
      vastly deeper pockets than most of the players in the space tourism
      industry.
     
      It is unlikely that any tourist rocket operator will be able to afford a
      comprehensive test program.
      Different firms have suggested they will fly
      from 25 to 200 test flights before paying passengers are accepted.
      These numbers are both too small to reveal all the potential failure modes and
      so large relative to the average rocketplane lifetime that a crash in the
      test program is likely.
     
      So there is no getting around the fact that the first generation of
      tourist rocketplanes are going to be far more dangerous than any other
      aircraft.
       The fatal crash rate will be at least 1-in-200 and probably more
      like 1-in-50. How does this affect the prospects for this industry?
     
      Most skeptical commentators have emphasized the effect of unfavorable
      publicity on a business that has basically been created by publicity. The
      first few commercial rocketplane accidents will be front-page news around
      the world. Any video clips will be played over and over on our TV screens,
      just like the last moments of Hindenburg, Challenger, and Columbia.
     
      I'm more concerned about the financial aspects of rocketplane crashes. It
      is not clear that the prospective operators have included the extra costs
      of accidents in their business plans.
     
      First, the initial cost of the vehicles cannot be amortized over thousands
      of flights as it is with normal airliners. Given the safety statistics
      cited above, each revenue flight must recover at least 2% of the
      construction cost in addition to all the operating costs and profit
      margin. There will also be a significant number of aborted flights for
      which the passengers will not pay.
     
      Second, there is the potential costs of lawsuits and damage claims
      resulting from rocketplane accidents. This problem is usually explained
      away by claiming that the passengers will have signed all sorts of
      releases before they board their fatal flight.
     
      But anybody rich enough to pay $200,000 for 5 minutes in space will have
      rich relatives, rich business partners and greedy heirs who will not have
      signed releases.
      In many cases these associates will not share the
      passenger's mania for space and will have opposed the passenger's decision
      to fly. Many of them will be able to demonstrate financial or emotional
      losses from the passenger's death and will be able to afford good lawyers.
     
      And that libertarian regulatory environment has two features that make
      rocketplane operators extremely vulnerable to damage suits:
      1) There is no statutory limit on the size of damage judgements such as
      the airline industry has under the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the
      Montreal Convention of 1999.
      2) Defense lawyers will not be able to use compliance with government
      regulations as a defense. They will not be able to call FAA inspectors or
      NTSB investigators as witnesses to testify that the crashed rocketplane
      met all applicable safety rules.
     
      Liability insurance? Forget it. No insurance company is likely to sell
      policies to rocketplane operators at acceptable rates. The very richest
      operators like Sir Richard Branson may choose to self-insure - but their
      ultra deep pockets will attract the very best tort lawyers.
     
      Many Space Cadets excuse the dangers of space flight by emphasizing the
      dangers of the past. They are always talking about how few of Magellan's
      men got back, or how many of the pioneer aviators broke their necks - and
      citing these dreadful statistics as examples to be emulated in the 21st
      century.
     
      The problem with this rationalization is: That was then, this is now. The
      public's tolerance for violent death is a lot lower in 2006 than it was in
      1536 or even 1906. That's why we see hard hats, safety goggles, and
      steel-toed boots at every construction site. That's why seat belts are
      compulsory in cars and fighter jets have ejection seats.
      Recall that the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor VTOL transport aircraft was nearly
      cancelled in 2000 after two fatal crashes in operational testing. The
      public has come to expect that even radically new aircraft won't kill
      anyone. And this same public will be in the jury box at the first
      rocketplane liability trial.

      How does the space tourism industry deal with these problems? Mostly with
      wishful thinking and blind hostility to the skeptics. Even Supreme
      Rocketplane Guru Burt Rutan has been in trouble since he pointed out some
      of these issues at a conference. A few operators have vague plans to
      operate from nations not ruled by lawyers, but most seem to be sticking
      with the US.

      So the rational side of my brain has stopped the romantic side from buying
      any stock in rocketplane firms. The current situation reminds me of two
      other periods when excessive enthusiasm for rocket propulsion led to
      tragedy.

      The first golden age of reckless rocketry was in Germany during the
      Roaring 20s. Primitive black-powder rockets roared on automobiles,
      gliders, railroad cars, and even sleds. Nothing useful was accomplished
      and one of the principal rocket promoters died. After Max Valier was
      killed by rocket shrapnel, the German Rocket Society found it almost
      impossible to raise money for serious rocketry research and the Nazis had
      a perfect excuse to shut down all private groups and absorb their more
      useful members into their military rocket program.

      The second period of amateur enthusiasts occurred in the wake of Sputnik I
      when nerdy teenagers all over the world rushed to their basements and
      began working on model rockets. This era was brilliantly recalled in Homer
      Hickham's novel "Rocket Boys" and the movie "October Sky".

      Hickham's amateur rocketeers managed not to kill anybody in their sparsely
      populated part of West Virginia, but other such groups suffered deaths and
      serious injuries. Many US states and European nations passed laws banning
      home-made rockets, and the hobby only survived because commercially
      manufactured solid rocket mini-motors became available.
      I fear that the space tourism industry is headed for a third cycle of
      unnecessary deaths followed by a regulatory crackdown -- exactly the
      opposite of what the would-be space tycoons are trying to achieve.

      Jeffrey F. Bell is a former space scientist and recovering pro-space
      activist.